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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This is an appeal of a final order in a formal adjudicative proceeding before the
Public Service Commission of Utah ("Commission"). The Utah Supreme Court has
jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(e)(i) as this is a
Petition for Review of the final order of the Commission. On June 16, 2016, the Utah
Supreme Court issued an Order transferring this matter over to the Utah Court of Appeals
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(4). This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-4-103(2)G).

ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Did the Commission err when it determined that Carbon/Emery was

required to present all empirical evidence on the cost of equity in its direct
testimony?

Standard of Review: This is an error of law reviewed for correction. A party is
permitted to introduce relevant rebuttal testimony, and the Commission's determination
that Carbon/Emery's failure to present certain evidence in its direct testimony amounted
to a failure to present evidence to support its requested cost of equity is an erroneous
conclusion of law. Questions of law are subject to a non-deferential review for
correctness. Ellis-Hall Consultants v. Public Service Commission, 2016 UT 34, 379 P.3d
1270.
Issue Preserved in the Record: Carbon/Emery preserved the issue of whether
Carbon/Emery presented empirical evidence on the cost of equity in its Petition for

Review, Rehearing, or Reconsideration. R. Vol. 2, 1937-1941. In the Commission's
Order on Petition for Review, Rehearing, and Reconsideration, the Commission indicated
that if Carbon/Emery wanted the Commission to rely on its evidence presented by
Douglas Meredith, related to cost of equity, it should have presented such testimony in its
direct testimony. R. 2942-2943. Because this issue was initially raised by the
Commission's Order on Reconsideration, this Appeal/Petition for Review is the first
opportunity Carbon/Emery has had procedurally to address this Commission
determination.

2.
•

Did the Commission err in imputing a hypothetical capital structure of

43. 79% debt and 56.21 % equity to Carbon/Emery where Carbon/Emery has no
debt, and the imputation of such capital structure is contrary to its prior practice,
and otherwise arbitrary and capricious?

~

Standard of Review: The Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA) governs
review of Carbon/Emery's claim on appeal. See Utah Code Ann.§ 63G-4-403. This
section provides that the procedures for agency action are applicable to all agency actions
and adjudicative proceedings on or after January 1, 1988. Moreover,§ 63G-4-403 of the
Utah Code sets forth the types of agency actions for which appellate courts may grant
relief, but does not expressly mandate the standard of review the court must employ when
reviewing these decisions. See Murray v. Labor Comm 'n, 2013 UT 38, ,r 18, 308 P.3d
461,468. Some of these provisions, however, do imply a standard of review such as
subsections (g) and (h)(i), (h)(iii), (h)(iv). Id., 2013 UT 38, ,r 19, 308 P.3d at 468. Utah
Code § 63G-4-403 reads:
2

(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's
record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substantially
prejudiced by any of the following:
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action is
based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied;
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any statute;
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution;
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law;
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-making
process, or has failed to follow prescribed procedure;

(t) the persons taking the agency action were illegally constituted as a
decision-making body or were subject to disqualification;
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or
implied by the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when
viewed in light of the whole record before the court;
(h) the agency action is:
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute;
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency;
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency
justifies the inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that
demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the inconsistency; or
(iv) otherwise arbitrary and capricious.
The standard of review under Sections 63G-4-403(4)(h)(i), (h)(iii), and (h)(iv) is
the substantial evidence standard which provides that the finding of the Commission will
be upheld if supported by substantial evidence.
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Issue Preserved in the Record: Carbon/Emery preserved this issue in its Post-

i

Hearing Closing Argument, and in its Petition for Review, Rehearing and
Reconsideration. See R. Vol. 2, 1941-1943.

3.

Did the Commission err in determining the appropriate depreciation

expense for Carbon/Emery during the test period?
Standard of Review: This issue involves two standards of review.
The court must review if the Commission abused its discretion in determining the
depreciation expense adjustment. The Commission has been granted discretion to
determine public utilities depreciation rates and accounts. Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-24.
Although the Commission has the discretion to determine an appropriate depreciation
expense for Carbon/Emery in the test year, it must do so in conformity with the
fundamental goal of rate making to select a test year and adjust it for known and
@

measurable changes such that it reasonably approximates the rate-effective period. See
Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Public Service Commission, 861 P.2d 414,422 (Utah 1993).
The determination of whether the test year as adjusted by the Commission
reasonably approximates the rate effective period is a question of fact which will be
upheld if supported by "substantial evidence based on the record as a whole." Resort
Retainers v. Labor Comm 'n, 2010 UT App 229, ~ 13,238 P.3d 1081, 1084. If there is
not substantial evidence to support the finding that the test year, as adjusted, reasonably
approximates the rate-effective period, the Commission will have abused its discretion in
determining the depreciation expense adjustment for the test period.

4

Issue Preserved in the Record: Carbon/Emery preserved this issue in its PostHearing Closing Brief and in its Petition for Review, Rehearing and Reconsideration.
See R. Vol. 2, 1946-1953.
4.

Did the Commission fail to determine whether Carbon/Emery's

selection of the group method of accounting was imprudent when the decision was
made?

Standard of Review: Under Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-4(4 ):
If in the Commission's determination of just, reasonable or sufficient rates, the
Commission considers the prudence of an action taken by a public utility, or an
expense incurred by a public utility, the Commission shall apply the following
standard in making its prudence determination:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)

Ensure just and reasonable rates for the retail ratepayers of the public utility
in this state;
focus on the reasonableness of the expense resulting from the action of the
public utility judged as of the time the action was taken;
determine whether a reasonable utility, knowing what the utility knew or
reasonably should have known at the time of the action, would reasonably
have incurred all or some portion of the expense, in taking the same or
some other prudent action.

Failure to comply with the statute is an erroneous interpretation of the law under
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-403( d). Questions of law are subject to a non-deferential
review for correctness. Ellis-Hall, 2016 UT 34, 379 P.3d 1270.
Issue Preserved in the Record: Carbon/Emery preserved this issue in its Post..
Hearing Closing Brief and in its Petition for Review, Rehearing and Reconsideration.
See R. 2712; R. Vol. 2, 1955-1956.

5

DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW

All relevant statutes and rules pertinent to the issues before the Court are
contained in the body of the brief. Determinative provisions include Utah Code Ann. §
54-4-4; Utah Code Ann.§ 54-7-12.1; Utah Code Ann.§ 54-8b-15; Utah Code Ann§
63G-4-206; Utah Code Ann.§ 63G-4-403; and Utah Admin. Code§ R746-360-6.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I.

NATURE OF THE CASE
Carbon/Emery is a rural rate of return regulated incumbent telephone corporation

that provides telecommunications services in Carbon County, Utah. As an incumbent
telephone corporation designated an "eligible telecommunications carrier" pursuant to 4 7
U.S.C. § 214(e), Carbon/Emery is entitled to receive Utah Universal Service Fund
("UUSF") Support pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 54-8b-15 and Utah Admin. Code §
R746-360-6.

II.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
In March of 2015, Carbon/Emery determined that its revenues from all sources fell

short of its reasonable costs to provide basic phone service plus a reasonable return on
investment. In other words, Carbon/Emery, a regulated rate of return telecommunications
company, was under-earning as a regulated public utility. Carbon/Emery prepared and
filed an Application for Increase in UUSF Distribution seeking an increase of $563,262
in annual support from the UUSF. Carbon/Emery filed testimony in support of its
Application. Carbon/Emery amended its application on April 2, 2015 and amended its
testimony in support thereof, requesting an increase in UUSF support of $816,909
("Amended Application").
In prosecuting Carbon/Emery's Application, the Utah Public Service Commission
("Commission") was charged with determining whether Carbon/Emery is entitled to
additional UUSF disbursements. The factors to be determined by the Commission in
determining the UUSF eligibility and amount are set forth in Utah Code and Commission

7

••

Rules. Utah Code Ann. § 54-8b-15 establishes the Utah Universal Service Fund
t,

("UUSF"). Eligibility for disbursements under the UUSF for rate of return incumbent
telephone corporations such as Carbon/Emery is determined under rules promulgated by
the Commission pursuant to Utah Code Ann.§ 54-8b-15(3) and found in Utah Admin.
Code§ R746-360-6(2)(b) which provides:
Rate of return Incumbent telephone corporations shall complete a
Commission review of their revenue requirement and public
telecommunications services' rate structure prior to any change in their
USF distribution which differs from a prior USF distribution.
Utah Admin. Code R746-360-6(2)(b).

•

In addition, section R746-360-8 provides the method of calculating fund
distributions for rate of return incumbent telephone corporations:
Monies from the fund will equal the numerical difference between the
Incumbent telephone corporation's total embedded costs of providing
public telecommunications services, for a designated support area, less the
product of the Incumbent telephone corporation's Average Revenue Per
Line, for the designated support area, times the Incumbent telephone
corporation's active access lines in the designated support area. "Total
embedded costs" shall include a weighted average rate of return on capital
of the intrastate and interstate jurisdictions.
In many instances, an application for UUSF Distribution will be made in
conjunction with an application for rate increase made under Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-4.
In this case, however, at the time of Carbon/Emery's Application, Carbon/Emery's rates
were already at the Commission approved affordable base rate of $16.50 and $26.00 for
residential and commercial service. As a result, Carbon/Emery's Application for UUSF

•

•

Increase was not a rate case. However, to determine Carbon/Emery's eligibility for
UUSF disbursements, the Commission was required to review Carbon/Emery's revenue

8

requirement, including total embedded costs, average revenue per line, and return on
capital, as it would in a rate case. Therefore, the statutes governing the determination of
just and reasonable rates are instructive for the calculation of UUSF disbursements.
In this case, Carbon/Emery identified an historical test period of January 1, 2014
through December 31, 2014 in its Application, adjusted for known and measurable
changes as permitted by Utah Code Ann.§ 54-4-4(3)(b).
As is the practice before the Commission, Carbon/Emery, the Division of Public
Utilities ("Division"), the Office of Consumer Services ("Office"), and the Utah Rural
Telecom Association ("URTA") 1 pre-filed written testimony in this proceeding.
Carbon/Emery Chief Executive Officer, Brock Johansen, and Chief Financial Officer,
Darren Woolsey, filed testimony in support of the Amended Application
contemporaneously with the filing of the Amended Application on April 2, 2015. R. 4465; R. Vol. 1, 178-355. On April 24, 2015, Carbon/Emery filed Supplemental Direct
Testimony of Darren Woolsey. R. 71-73; R. Vol. 1, 356-358. After the Amended
Application was filed, the Commission held a Scheduling Conference and issued a
scheduling order which contemplated that direct, rebuttal, and surrebuttal testimony
would be pre-filed in advance of the hearing. R. 79-85. Specifically, the Scheduling
Order in this case provided as follows:
Parties' Direct Testimony, other than Company Friday, August 21, 2015
Requests for Intervention

1 URTA

Friday, August 28, 2015

is not a party to this appeal.
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Parties' Rebuttal Testimony

Friday, September 4, 2015

Parties' Surrebuttal Testimony

Friday, September 18, 2015

R. 79-85.
The following Testimony was filed by the Parties in advance of the hearing2 :
Date
April 2, 2015

Party
Testimony
Carbon/Emery Amended Direct -Brock Johansen

Amended Direct - Darren Woolsey
April 24, 2015

Carbon/Emery Supplemental Direct - Woolsey

August 21,
2015

Division

Direct - Joseph Hellewell
Direct - William Duncan

August 21,
2015

Office

Direct - Casey Coleman
Direct - David Brevitz
Direct - Bion Ostrander

September 4,
2015
September 4,
2015
September 4,
2015
September 18,
2015
September 18,
2015

Carbon/Emery Rebuttal - Woolsey

Division
Office

Rebuttal - Douglas Meredith
Rebuttal - Hellewell
Rebuttal - Duncan
Rebuttal- Brevitz

Carbon/Emery Surrebuttal - Meredith
Surrebuttal - Woolsey
Division
Surrebuttal - Hellewell
Surrebuttal - Duncan

2

~

~

Record
R. 44-51
R. Vol. 1, 178-187
R. 52-65
R. Vol. 1, 188-355
R. 71-73
R. Vol. 1, 356-358
R. 141-151
R. Vol. 1, 359-395
R. 153-156
R. Vol. 1, 3 96-402
R.158-171
R. 203-224
R. Vol. 1, 403-431
R. 1871-1924
R. Vol. 1, 514-527
R. Vol. 1, 129-194
R. Vol. 2, 1-58; 118128
R. 1590-1870
R. 336-338
R. 1437-1442
R. Vol. 1, 1070-1085
R. 1135-1145
R. 1146-1147
R. 816-826
R. 828-833

The table reflects the testimony and the record pursuant to the Joint Motion of the
Parties filed on September 18, 2015 (R. 1130-1134), and the Stipulation to Clarify the
Record filed by the Public Service Commission with the Utah Court of Appeals on
January 5, 2017.
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September 18,
2015

Office

Surrebuttal - Coleman
Surrebuttal - Brevitz
Surrebuttal - Ostrander

December 18,
2015
January 15,
2016

Carbon/Emery Sur-surrebuttal - Woolsey
Division

Sur-surrebuttal - Hellewell

R. Vol. 1, 2329-2336
R. 836-870
R. 871-1055
R. Vol. 1, 2337-2372
R. 1927-1966
R. Vol. 1, 2414-2475
R. Vol. 2, 265-304
R. 1989-2008
R. Vol. 2, 354-763
R. 2010-2019
R. Vol. 2, 764-790

In the process of filing pre-hearing testimony, Carbon/Emery discovered four
known and measurable changes to its test year period, which reduced Carbon/Emery's
requested annual UUSF support to $570,643. R. Vol. 2, p. 117.
A hearing in this matter was held before the Commission on January 26 and 27,
2016. All pre-filed testimony was admitted into the record without objection. R. Vol. 2,
p. 998 at p. 9. The Commission ordered closing arguments to be provided in written form
by the parties, Post-Hearing. All parties filed their Post-Hearing Closing Arguments on
. March 2, 2016.
The Office made several errors in its written Closing Argument, which it
attempted to correct with an Errata Sheet filed on March 7, 2016. Carbon/Emery
objected to the Office's Errata Sheet because it contained "corrections" that were not
supported by the evidence in the record. Closing Argument Replies were filed by the
parties on March 9, 2016. No other objections to the Closing Arguments were filed.

III.

DISPOSITION
The Commission found that Carbon demonstrated that its regulated revenues from

all sources in the test period (revenues received from the provision of services in both the
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interstate and intrastate jurisdictions, all revenues derived from providing network
(i

elements, services, functionalities, and all support funds received from the Federal
Universal Service Support Fund) did not cover its reasonable costs of providing basic
telephone service plus a reasonable rate of return in the test period, and that
Carbon/Emery was entitled to some level of UUSF support. However, in the
Commission's March 31, 2016 Order, the Commission determined that Carbon/Emery
was not entitled to an increase in its UUSF support. R. Vol. 2, 1900. Rather, the
Commission determined that Carbon/Emery's current UUSF support should be reduced
by $152,645.70 annually per year through December 31, 2019, and a further annual

(i

reduction of $185,546.64 beginning on January 1, 2020, in the absence of a prior
demonstration by Carbon/Emery that the decrease is no longer warranted. Id.
In reaching this conclusion, the Commission made several errors, and
Carbon/Emery seeks review of the Commission's determination of the amount of UUSF
to which the Commission determined Carbon/Emery was entitled. Carbon/Emery filed a
Petition for Review, Rehearing, and Reconsideration with the Public Service Commission
on April 29, 2016. R. 2879-2908; R. Vol. 2, 1930-1959. On May 19, 2016, the
Commission entered an Order denying the Petition for Review addressing the issues
raised by Carbon/Emery. R. 2936-2959. Carbon/Emery filed its Notice of Appeal with
the Utah Supreme Court on June 16, 2016. Carbon/Emery's Appeal was transferred to
this Court.

12

IV.

STATEMENT OFF ACTS
1.

Carbon/Emery is a telephone corporation qualified to do business in Utah.

Carbon/Emery operates as a location exchange carrier providing telecommunications
services in the state of Utah under authority issued to Carbon/Emery by the Commission.
R. 38.
2.

Carbon/Emery has been designated an "eligible telecommunications

carrier" pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 214(e). R. 38.
3.

At the time of the filing of its Amended Application, Carbon/Emery's rates

for services were at the Commission approved affordable base rate. R. 40.
4.

Carbon/Emery, by its Amended Application, seeks an increase in UUSF

•

support. R. 38.
5.

Carbon/Emery's request for UUSF supp01i was calculated based on a 2014

historical test year. R. Vol. 2, 1905.
6.

Carbon/Emery provides both intrastate and interstate services with-%

of Carbon/Emery's operations intrastate, and-% of its operations are interstate. R.
Vol. 2, 1906.
7.

•
•

During the test period, Carbon/Emery had no debt. R. Vol. 2, 1906. The

Commission adopted a cost of debt of 5.636%. R. Vol. 2, 1908.
8.

Carbon/Emery participates in one of the National Exchange Carriers

Associations (NECA) common line services costs pools. The September 30, 2014 NECA
form 492 reports this cost pool's earned rate of return at 11.45%. R. Vol. 2, p. 1906.
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•
•

•
This is the rate that was used in Carbon/Emery' s rate of return calculation for interstate
•

purposes. R. Vol. 2, p 1914.
9.

Carbon/Emery' s application requested a return on equity of 12.13% and an

imputation of a hypothetical capital structure of 65% equity and 35% debt. R. 39.
10.

The Division also proposed use of a hypothetical capital structure of 65%

equity and 35% debt and a cost of equity of 10.75%. R. 161, 164.

•

11.

Initially the Division suggested an interstate rate of return of 9 .4%, but

ultimately, the Division revised its calculation and utilized an interstate rate of return of
11.45%, consistent with Carbon/Emery' s calculation. R. 166, 839. This resulted in a

•

Division supported overall rate of return of 9.85%. R. 867. Finally, at the hearing, the
Division further corrected its pre-filed testimony by revising the Division's recommended
overall rate of return to 9.97%. R. Vol. 2, p. 998 at p. 168:7-169:15 .

•

12.

The Office proposed use of a 50/50 hypothetical capital structure. R. Vol. 2,

315 ; R. 1979. The Office proposed a cost of equity of 10%. R. Vol. 2, 322. Finally, the

•

Office suggested the appropriate interstate rate of return was 9 .4%, for an overall rate of
return of 8.45%. R. Vol. 2, 315, 317, 323. This was amended at the hearing due to an
e1Tor in the interstate/intrastate separations and the Office corrected its overall rate of

•

return to 8.46%. R. 2700 at p. 250 .
13.

Carbon/Emery' s application included a depreciation expense o f - .

R. Vol.I , 203 .

•

•
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•
14.

Carbon/Emery employs a group method of depreciation which applies the

Commission ordered depreciation rates to the appropriate group accounts using a

•

straight-line method. R. Vol. 2, 40-41; R. 596-624.
15.

The Division proposed a depreciation expense of

for the test

year (adjustment to the test year o f - ) using the single asset straight-line method

•

of depreciation. R. Vol. 1, 361, 366; R. Vol. 2, 773.
16.

The Division, in its testimony, identified five appropriate methods of

depreciation: single asset Single Asset Straight Line; Straight Line Vintage Group

•

Depreciation; Net Book Value Group Depreciation; Depreciation Studies; or the FCC

•

Method. R. Vol. 1, 367-368.
17.

With regard to the FCC Method identified by Mr. Hellewell, he stated:

The FCC has developed a formula that has been used to recalculate the
depreciation rate based on the plants average remaining life, future net salvage,
and depreciation reserve ratio. This formula has been published in several orders.
(FCC 00-306, FCC 96-485) From FCC 00-306, "The depreciation rate for an
account is a function of the associated plant's average remaining life, future net
salvage, and depreciation reserve ratio. The depreciation rate is calculated using
the following formula:
Depreciation Rate = 100% - Accumulated Depreciation % - Future Net Salvage %
Average Remaining Life
Both the average remaining life and the future net salvage factors are based upon
estimates that require periodic review to ensure their reasonableness."

•
•

R. Vol. 1, 368.
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•

•
18.

•

The Division calculated the depreciation expense using the Vintage Group

method as

(adjustment to the test year in the amount of

Vol. 2, 773.
19.

Carbon/Emery calculated the depreciation expense using the FCC Method

of depreciation, which resulted in a test year depreciation expense of between and -

depending on whether a mid-year convention or year-end calculation was

used. R. Vol. 2, 370.
20.

A hearing in this matter was held before the Commission on January 26 and

27, 2016. All pre-filed testimony was admitted into the record without objection. R. Vol.
2, 998 at p. 9.
21.

The Commission ordered closing arguments to be provided in written form

by the parties, post-hearing. R. Vo l. 2, 2700 at p. 314.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The Court of Appeals should reverse the Public Service Commission's Order on
Motion for Review, Rehearing and Reconsideration, and remand to the P ublic Service
Commission. The Commission erroneously concluded that the evidence offered by
Carbon/Emery's expert in Rebuttal Testimony was not properly subjected to the
adversarial process because it was offered in rebuttal, rather than in Carbon/Emery's
direct testimony, and was thus, not considered empirical evidence offered in support of
Carbon/Emery's cost of equity, and rate of return calculation. This incorrect legal

•
•

conclusion should be reversed, and the Commission should be directed to properly
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consider all the admitted evidence. Similarly, the Commission made certain procedural
legal errors when it determined that Carbon/Emery had not properly preserved certain
issues that were raised in the Post-Hearing Closing Argument. The Commission's
determination that Carbon/Emery's raising of these issues was "untimely" should be
reversed.
Additionally, the capital structure imputed to Carbon/Emery, also used in the rate
of return calculation, is arbitrary and capricious and not supported by substantial
evidence. The determination does not enunciate any methodology or standard that could
be duplicated in future proceedings (even proceedings limited to Carbon/Emery).
Further, the capital structure determination was made contrary to existing Commission
policy, without adequate facts and reasons given for the departure. As a result, the
Commission's determination of the imputed capital structure was unfair and irrational,
and should be reversed and remanded to the Commission.
Finally, the determination of the depreciation expense adjustment is contrary to the
fundamental ratemaking goal which requires that the adjusted test year reasonably
approximate the test period. In this case, the finding that the test year reasonably
approximates the test period is not supported by substantial evidence. As a result, the
Commission abused its discretion in determining the depreciation expense adjustment.
The Commission further erred by failing to judge the prudence of Carbon/Emery's use of
the group method of accounting at the time the decision was made, as required by Utah
Code Ann. § 54-4-4(4 ).
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ARGUMENTS
1.

The Commission Erred When It Determined That Carbon/Emery Was
Required To Present All Empirical Evidence On The Cost Of Equity In Its
Direct Testimony.

In its Amended Application, Carbon/Emery proposes the use of an overall rate of
return of 10.50%. R. 59. This composite rate was derived using theoretical capital
structure of 65% equity and 35% debt, a state cost of equity of 12.13%, a state return on

•

debt of 5.636%, and interstate rate of return of 11.45%, derived from NECA's Form 492
filing with the FCC on September 30, 2014 for calendar year 2013 pool participants. R.
59-60. According to the Direct Testimony of Darren Woolsey, Carbon/Emery requested
12.13% cost of equity to "mirror the cost of equity used and approved by the Commission
in other recent USF proceedings." R. 60-61. Mr. Woolsey's Amended Direct Testimony
was filed with the Amended Application on April 2, 2015.
Four months later, on August 21, 2015, the Division filed the Direct Testimony of
William Duncan and the Direct Testimony of Casey Coleman. Similarly, on August 21,
2015, the Office of Consumer Services presented the Direct Testimony of Bion Ostrander
and David Brevitz. Pursuant to standard Commission procedure, this was the first-time
Carbon/Emery was made aware of the formal positions of the Division and the Office and
the "contested issues" in the case.
In their pre-filed direct testimony, the Office and the Division took issue with
Carbon/Emery's rate of return, and filed testimony on what each believed the overall rate

•

of return should be. R. 166; R. Vol. 2, 311. In particular, the Division's witness, Casey
Coleman utilized a capital asset pricing model (CAPM) to establish the cost of equity at
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•
10.75%, utilizing a capital structure of 65% equity and 35% debt, and an interstate rate of
return of 9.4%, resulting in an overall rate of return of 9.12%. R. 161, 164, 166. In Casey
Coleman's surrebuttal testimony, he revised his calculation and utilized an interstate rate
of return of 11 .45%, consistent with Carbon/Emery's calculation. R. 839. This resulted
in a Division supported overall rate of return of 9.85%. R. 867. Finally, at the hearing,
Casey Coleman further corrected his pre-filed testimony by revising the Division's
recommended overall rate of return to 9.97%. R. Vol. 2, 998 at p. 168:7-169:15.
The Office's witness, David Brevitz, testified that several cases before the Kansas
Corporation Commission, which resulted in a cost of equity of approximately 10%,
provided a reasonable basis for the Commission to adopt a cost of equity of 10%. R. Vol.
2, 322. Mr. Brevitz also recommended imputing a hypothetical capital structure of 50/50
and an interstate rate of return of9.4%, for an overall rate of return of 8.45%. R. Vol. 2,
315, 317, 323; R. 2700 at p. 250.
To rebut these calculations, Carbon/Emery engaged its consultant, Douglas
Meredith, to provide testimony further supporting the reasonableness of Carbon/Emery's
requested cost of equity, and disputing the calculations of cost of equity provided by the
Office and the Division. This testimony was filed as Rebuttal Testimony by Douglas
Meredith on September 18, 2015.
Mr. Meredith testified in pre-filed rebuttal testimony that Carbon/Emery's
requested 12.13% return on equity was reasonable based on several factors. First, Mr.
Meredith identified that Carbon/Emery's calculated overall rate of return was based on an
overall rate of return that had been recently proposed by the Division and was used in
19

Carbon/Emery's affiliate Emery Telephone's Utah USF request finalized earlier in the
year, and that Carbon/Emery assumed that since the Division had been comfortable with
its proposed rate of return in January for an affiliate, the same rate of return should be
used in the Carbon/Emery proceeding that was filed a few months later. R. 1594.
Mr. Meredith further testified that if the rate of return were going to be at issue in
this case, the Commission should consider a rate of return higher than Carbon/Emery's
proposed 10.50%. R. 1596. However, Mr. Meredith also testified there was "more than
enough evidence to support the 10.50% rate of return based on the information in this
proceeding and filed at the Federal Communications Commission." R. 1596. Mr.
Meredith then summarized FCC proceedings related to interstate rate of return which he
testified supported Carbon/Emery's requested overall rate of return of 10.50% as just and
reasonable. R. 1596-1598.
Mr. Meredith also directly challenged Casey Coleman's CAPM analysis for
determination of the appropriate and reasonable cost of equity, and provided substantial
testimony refuting Mr. Coleman's model. R. 1598-1604. Specifically, of the 13 "peer
group" companies chosen by Mr. Coleman, Mr. Meredith testified that 11 of the
companies were not comparable, or were distressed companies not properly included in
Mr. Coleman's CAPM. R. 1598-1599. Specifically, Mr. Meredith stated the following
companies were not appropriately considered "comparable companies:" HickoryTech
(should not be included because it was purchased by Consolidated Communications);
Alteva (not comparable because the majority of its revenues are generated from VoIP and
wireless); Atlantic Tele-Network (does not have ILEC operations; its primary wireline

•
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operations are in Guyana; and a good portion of its revenues are generated from wireless
operations); Earthlink (no ILEC operations); and IDT (no ILEC operations). R. 15981599. Mr. Meredith further rejected Frontier, Windstream, Alaska Communications,
Otelco, and New Ulm as comparable companies because they are distressed or in
bankruptcy and have negative beta values using September 4, 2015 Yahoo! Finance
reports (the same source used by Mr. Coleman). R. 1599.
The Office witness David Brevitz also criticized the companies selected by Mr.
Coleman for his CAPM calculation. R. Vol. 1, 1079-1082. Specifically, Mr. Brevitz
identified seven of Mr. Coleman's "comparable companies" as inappropriate: Hickory
Tech Corporation (should not be included because it is no longer in existence, so no
public data is available for its operations); Atlantic Tele-Network (should not be included
because it's not comparable to the U.S. wireline telephone business); Cincinnati Bell
(should not be included as a comparable company since it serves a single large and
compact metropolitan area and also operates very significant IT services, hardware and
data center business, including "managed infrastructure services, IT and telephone
equipment sales, and provisional IT staffing services); IDT Corporation (should not be
included due to lack of comparability to the U.S. wireline telephone business); Alteva
lri.c. (should not be included because company's operations and management appear to
me to be very problematic); EarthLink Holdings (ELNK) (should not be included due to
lack of comparability to the U.S. wireline telephony business); FairPoint
Communications (FRP) (should not be included because the company has yet to earn a
profit, and it is unclear if and when it may do so). R. Vol. 1, 1079-1082.
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In addition to the substantial testimony related to the dissimilarities of the
companies selected in the peer group, Mr. Meredith offered an alternate CAPM
calculation to be considered by the Commission, and testimony on other methods of
calculation of the cost of capital, including the free cash flow method proposed by
NTCA. R. 1598-1605. Finally, Mr. Meredith provided evidence that Mr. Coleman's use
of spot rates for the inputs in his CAPM is problematic because of the natural fluctuations
in the market. R. 1600-1601. Mr. Meredith recommended using a trended rate, rather
than spot rates. R. 1600.
In short, Mr. Meredith provided extensive testimony in support of Carbon/Emery's
cost of capital and rate of return proposed rates, and in rebuttal to the Division and the
Office of Consumer Service's calculations. Mr. Meredith's rebuttal testimony was
admitted into the record without objection. R. Vol. 2, 998 at p. 9.
After rebuttal testimony, all parties had the opportunity to pre-file surrebuttal and
sur-surrebuttal testimony prior to the hearing. In fact, David Brevitz filed surrebuttal
testimony directly addressing Douglas Meredith's Rebuttal Testimony on Rate of Return
issues. R. Vol. 2, 2338. Similarly, Casey Coleman filed surrebuttal testimony directly
addressing the rebuttal testimonies of Douglas Meredith and David Brevitz. R. 838. All
of the surrebuttal and sur-surrebuttal testimony was admitted into the record without
objection. R. Vol. 2, 998 at p. 9. Finally, both the Division and the Office had the
opportunity to cross-examine Mr. Meredith at the hearing. R. Vol. 2, 998 at pp. 115-137.
Despite the fact that all adverse parties had the opportunity to respond to the Rebuttal
Testimony of Douglas Meredith, and in fact, provided response to Douglas Meredith's
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testimony in their Surrebuttal Testimony, and had the opportunity to cross-examine Mr.
Meredith at hearing, the Commission erroneously determined that "because
Carbon/Emery did not present its testimony regarding the trended rate and the free cash
flow methodology until rebuttal testimony, other parties did not have a full opportunity to
rebut it." R. 2942. This conclusion is erroneous.
The Commission further determined that Carbon/Emery's testimony on the
trended rate and free cash flow methodologies for establishing the cost of capital could
not be considered "unrebutted." R. 2942. The Commission did not, and could not, base
this decision on a finding that Carbon/Emery's evidence on differing methodologies for
determining the cost of capital was actually rebutted by the other parties. Rather, the
Commission made the erroneous legal decision to "decline to consider Mr. Meredith's
testimony as 'unrebutted"' and then declined to rely on Carbon/Emery's representations
regarding what the return on equity would be if it were calculated in a different way from
that recommended by the Division and the Office because the other parties did not have a
full opportunity to rebut Carbon/Emery's testimony on this matter. R. 2942-2943. The
Commission determined that the adverse parties' failure to present rebuttal testimony on
certain issues raised by Mr. Meredith was due to the lack of opportunity. This is not
correct as demonstrated by the fact that both adverse parties in fact filed surrebuttal
testimony addressing much of Mr. Meredith's testimony.
The Commission's goes on to state in its Order that:
"it is incumbent upon the applicant to set forth the data and methodologies
on which it asks the Commission to rely at a point in the proceeding where
the adverse parties may offer rebuttal testimony from their experts.
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Carbon/Emery failed to do so on the issue of return on equity, waiting until
rebuttal to introduce testimony regarding data and methodologies that it
considered persuasive."
R. 2942-2943.
Again, the Commission's conclusion that Carbon/Emery's evidence presented in
rebuttal testimony was provided at a point where the adverse parties could not offer
rebuttal testimony is a legal error which should be reviewed for correctness and reversed.
Taken to its logical conclusion, the Commission's findings on this issue would
require that an Applicant anticipate any and all potential legal arguments and positions
that may be taken by the adverse parties, and address those issues in the Applicant's
~

direct testimony. This would be an absurd result, particularly considering the procedures
employed by the Commission in UUSF Applications.

A.

The Commission's Interpretation on Rebuttal Evidence is Contrary to
Utah Admin Code§ R746-100-10.

The Commission's interpretation on rebuttal evidence is contrary to Utah Admin.
Code§ R746-100-10 which provides that the Commission is not bound by the technical
I>

rules of evidence and procedure. Utah Admin. Code §R746-100-10 addresses "evidence"
before the Commission and provides:
The Commission is not bound by the technical rules of evidence and may
receive any oral or documentary evidence; except that no finding may be
predicated solely on hearsay or otherwise incompetent evidence. Further,
the Commission may exclude non-probative, irrelevant, or unduly
repetitious evidence. Testimony shall be under oath and subject to crossexamination.
See also Beehive Tel Co v. PSC of Utah, 2004 UT 18 if 58 n. 14, 89 P.3d 131, 147.
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Carbon/Emery filed an application seeking relief from the Commission. In
support of this application, the applicant offered direct testimony. In its application,
Carbon/Emery proposed a rate of return of 10.5% based on its experience with the
Division and the Commission in a UUSF application filed earlier that year.
Carbon/Emery did not anticipate that its requested rate of return would be a contested
issue since the Division had used the same rate of return in Carbon/Emery's affiliates
case. Nevertheless, when it was, in fact, a contested issue, all parties had the opportunity
to address, rebut, and contest the evidence through pre-filed written testimony, and
through their witnesses at trial. The evidence submitted by Mr. Meredith was not
objected to by any party, and was admitted into the record. The adverse parties had the
opportunity to rebut the testimony and the Commission erred when it determined that
Carbon/Emery's submission of the evidence in rebuttal testimony was inappropriate.
Moreover, no party to the proceedings raised any objection or due process argument.
Because the Commission has indicated that it did not properly consider Mr.
Meredith's testimony because it was provided in rebuttal testimony, this Court should
remand this issue to the Commission with instructions to properly consider Mr.
Meredith's rebuttal testimony.
B.

Equitable Remedies Bar Any Challenge to Submission of Testimony in
Rebuttal Evidence.

The Commission's finding that Carbon/Emery's evidence presented by Mr.
Meredith in rebuttal testimony does not constitute empirical evidence on the issue of
return on equity because it was presented in rebuttal and not properly subjected to the
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adversarial process is barred by the doctrine of equitable estoppel. Utah's courts have
(i)

held that there are three elements to estoppel:
(I) An admission, statement, or act inconsistent with the claim afterwards asserted;
(2) Action by the other party on the faith of such admission, statement or act;
(3) Injury to such other party resulting from allowing the first party to contradict
or repudiate such admission, statement or act.
Monarrez v. Utah DOT, 2016 UT 10,135,368 P.3d 846, 859-60. The court has added
that "the usual rules of estoppel against" the government, and "courts must be cautious in
applying equitable estoppel against the State." Accordingly, estoppel is applied against
the state only "if necessary to prevent manifest injustice, and the exercise of
governmental powers will not be impaired as a result." Id.
In this case, the Commission admitted the rebuttal evidence of Douglas Meredith

€i

without objection from any party. Carbon/Emery relied on this admission. All parties
proceeded on the basis that Mr. Meredith's evidence was admitted. Mr. Meredith was
offered for cross examination and was subjected to cross examination. To allow the
Commission to find that evidence offered in pre-filed rebuttal testimony under these
circumstances, where no party has raised objection and no party has been denied the
opportunity to address the testimony would unduly prejudice Carbon/Emery.
Utah's Appellate court has permitted estoppel against governmental agencies in
Utah in other contexts. See Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Commission, 602

•
•

P.2d 689, 694 (Utah 1979) (estoppel was warranted because the government's clear and
well substantiated representations were contradicted by it subsequent actions). The
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Commission should be estopped from raising this issue when it previously admitted the
testimony into the record.
C.

The Commission's Finding is Contrary to Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-206.

Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-206 governs formal adjudicative proceedings at the
Commission and provides that the presiding officer shall "regulate the course of the
hearing to obtain full disclosure of relevant facts and to afford all parties reasonable
opportunity to present their positions," and "shall afford to all partied the opportunity to
present evidence, argue, respond, conduct cross examination, and submit rebuttal
testimony." Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-206(l)(a) and (d). Pursuant to Utah administrative
law, Carbon/Emery was entitled to submit its rebuttal testimony; the testimony was
admitted into the record without objection; and all parties had the opportunity to address
the testimony in surrebuttal testimony, sur-surrebuttal testimony, and in live testimony
and cross examination at the hearing. The Commission erred as a matter of law and this

•

Court should reverse the finding of the Commission regarding the rebuttal testimony
offered by Carbon/Emery.
2.

The Commission Erred In Imputing A Hypothetical Capital Structure Of
43.79% Debt And 56.21 % Equity To Carbon/Emery.
The record reflects that during the test period Carbon/Emery had no debt. R. Vol.

2, 1906. However, all parties to the proceeding recommended the imputation of some
debt to Carbon in calculation of the overall rate of return. The Office suggested
imputation of 50% debt R. Vol. 2, 315. The Division and Carbon/Emery proposed
application of a hypothetical capital structure against Carbon/Emery utilizing the method
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•

•

developed by a taskforce appointed by the Commission in 2008. R. 39, 161; R. Vol. 2,

e

998 at p. 163-167. In particular, as stated in the Testimony of Casey Coleman, William
Duncan, and Douglas Meredith, both the Division and Carbon/Emery recommended
imputation of 3 5% debt to Carbon/Emery to provide regulatory consistency to Carbon. R.
161; R. Vol. 2,998 at p. 195; R. 1438-1440; R. 1605. As presented in the testimony by
the Division and Carbon/Emery, in 2008 URTA petitioned the Commission for
rulemaking on capital structure. R. 1438. Prior to 2008, the Division had used various

Gi

policies for capital structure including: 1) use of an "average (50/50) capital structure;" 2)
use of the company's actual capital structure; 3) or a mixture of hypothetical and actual
~

capital structure. R. 1438-1440.
As stated by Mr. Duncan, "rural ILEC's faced a confusing situation, never
knowing what the 'rules' would be from case to case." R. 1439. In response to URTA's
petition for rulemaking in Docket No. 07-999-01, the Commission formed a task force to
study the questions related to capital structure and propose a rule to the Commission. R.
162, 1439. The taskforce ultimately proposed a capital structure rule to the Commission.

Id. The Commission did not adopt the rule, but stated in a letter in the docket that "the
general parameter of the rule accompanied by the variability attempted to be included in
the rule proposed may be applied by the Division itself in its interaction with companies."
R. 1439, citing Docket No. 07-999-01. From that point forward, the Division has
adopted the proposed rule as policy and has applied it consistently in its evaluation of rate

•
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cases and UUSF applications since that time. R 1439-1440. 3 As indicated by Mr.
Duncan, the Division has consistently utilized the Division's "policy" on capital
structure. R. 1440. As Casey Coleman testified such action was explicitly in some cases,
and implicitly in other cases, condoned by the Commission. R. 864. At no time since the
Division began using the capital structure policy in 2008 has the Commission issued any
written order, warning or dicta that the application of the Division's policy on capital
structure would be questioned or rejected.
Utah law permits "relief from agency action that is 'contrary to the agency's prior
practice' unless the agency 'gives facts and reasons that demonstrate a fair and rational
basis for the inconsistency."' Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Public Service Commission,

•

861 P.2d 414,421 (Utah 1993). Departure from the Division's policy on capital structure
is contrary to the Commission's prior practice, and the Commission has not justified the

•
3

In the Matter of the Increase in Rates of Manti Telephone Company, Docket No. 08046-01 (use of hypothetical 65% debt); In the Matter of Carbon/Emery Telcom 's
Application for Increase ofRates, Docket No. 09-2302-01 (use of actual debt because it
was between 35-65%); In the Matter of the Increase in Rates ofAll West
Communications, Inc., Docket No. 11-2180-01 (use of hypothetical 65% debt); In the
Matter of Manti Telephone Company's Application for Additional USF, Docket No. 13046-01 (use of hypothetical 65% debt); In the Matter of Gunnison Telephone Company's
Application for Rate Increase, Docket No. 14-043-0l(use of hypothetical 65% equity); In
the Matter of the Division ofPublic Utilities' Petition for Increased USF Distribution for
Hanksville Te/com, Inc., Docket No. 14-2303-01 (use of 65% equity); In the Matter of
Emery Telephone's Application for UUSF, Docket No. 14-042-01 (use of hypothetical
65% equity); In the Matter of Emery Telephone's Application for UUSF, Docket No. 15042-0l(use of hypothetical 65% equity); and In the Matter of UBTA-UBET
Communications Inc. 's application for Increase in UUSF, Docket No. 15-053-01 (use of
actual capital structure).
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inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the
(i)

inconsistency as required by Utah Code Ann. § 630-4-403.
The Commission, in its Order on Reconsideration, says Carbon/Emery has not
pointed to any Commission precedent establishing a standard hypothetical capital
structure. R. 2943. The Commission states that "Carbon/Emery inaccurately construes the
Commission's prior practice, conflating settlements with fully-litigated UUSF Cases." R.
2943. The Court may take judicial notice of the fact that in the past 15 years, prior to the
instant case, there was one fully litigated telecommunications UUSF case: In the Matter
of the Increase in Rates of Manti Telephone Company, Docket No. 08-046-01. In that

~

case, the Commission in its order adopted the Division's recommended capital structure,
consistent with the Division's policy, as "fair and reasonable." R. 846. Thus, the entirety
of recent fully litigated telecommunications UUSF cases, or rate cases before the
Commission supports the use of the hypothetical capital structure promulgated by the
task force and used by the Division.
Additionally, Casey Coleman testified that "while it is accurate to suggest that the
Commission was uncomfortable in having a formal rule to determine the hypothetical
capital structure, it is also accurate to point out that the Commission has approved
numerous rate cases where the Commission accepted the Division's policy of using a
65/35 hypothetical capital structure." R. 864. Further, this Court can take judicial notice
of the fact that In the Matter of the Division ofPublic Utilities' Petition for Increased
USF Distribution for Hanksville Te/com, Inc., Docket No. 14-2303-01 on August 27,
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2014 the Commission approved the use of 65% equity capital structure for Hanksville
Telcom, a company (and affiliate of Carbon/Emery) with no debt.
The Commission argues that approval of settlements by the Commission should
not be conflated with fully litigated UUSF cases, however, this argument is disingenuous.
While Carbon/Emery would agree that a black box settlement should not be conflated
with a fully litigated matter, when the terms of a settlement approved by the Commission
contain a particular capital structure that is consistent with the Division's policy, or an
Order of the Commission specifically adopts the Division's proposed capital structure
(that is consistent with Division policy) as fair and reasonable, in the absence of any other
stated Commission rule, it is reasonable for applicants to consider this a Commission
"practice" which would require the Commission to "give facts and reasons that
demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the inconsistency." Mountain Fuel Supply Co.,
861 P.2d at 421.
Carbon/Emery is required to establish a prima facie case that the administrative
agency's action in its case was contrary to the agency's prior practice. According to
Benson v. Peace Officer Standards & Training Council, 2011 UT App 220, 124, 261

P.3d 643, 651, Carbon/Emery must prove a prima facie case of substantial prejudice by a
preponderance of the evidence, in which case the burden then shifts to the agency to
"'demonstrate a fair and rational basis' for the departure from precedent in the instant .
case." Taylor v. Department of Commerce, 952 P.2d 1090, 1095 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)
(quoting Pickett v. Utah Dep't of Commerce, 858 P.2d 187, 191 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)).
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In this instance, the Commission has refused to acknowledge its "practice" and
ti)

has, therefore, declined to offer any such facts and reasons in support for its departure
from the practice. On the contrary, the Commission, in its Order, merely stated that "a
public utility is obligated to provide service efficiently, including using a prudent level of
debt as a lower cost source of capital than equity. Carbon/Emery's 100% equity capital
structure causes its weighted cost of capital to be too high." R. Vol. 2, 1912. The
Commission then states that "we impute debt to Carbon/Emery through the use of a
hypothetical debt/equity structure. However, we find the capital structure advocated by
the Division and Carbon/Emery to lack evidentiary support." Id.
This conclusion ignores the testimony of William Duncan cited above, and the
testimony of Douglas Meredith, and errs in adopting a policy that is not consistent with
prior practice. In addition to supporting the recommendation of the taskforce and the
long-standing policy of the Division, Douglas Meredith also testified that imputing 35%
debt to Carbon/Emery represents a reasonable balance of competing interests. R. Vol. 2,
998 at p. 111. Even the Office that argued for a 50/50 capital structure did not advocate
simply selecting a single company and imputing the capital structure of that company on
Carbon/Emery, as the Commission ultimately did in this case.

•

Despite the positions and the evidence of the Division, Carbon/Emery, and the
Office, the Commission concluded that imputing a hypothetical capital structure of
43.79% debt to Carbon/Emery is just and reasonable.
Utah Admin. Code § R 746-100-11.F( 1) requires that a party asking the
Commission to review the evidence that supports the challenged finding, as set forth in
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State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, ifil 33-44. 326 P.3d 645, 651-53. The Court in State v.
Nielsen held:

From here on our analysis will be focused on the ultimate question of
whether the appellant has established a basis for overcoming the healthy
dose of deference owed to factual findings and jury verdicts-and not on
whether there is a technical deficiency in marshaling meriting a default.
Id.

To meet Carbon/Emery's burden of persuasion on appeal, in reaching its
conclusion on capital structure the Commission likely relied on the testimony offered by
the Office's witness, David Brevitz. Mr. Brevitz testified that Carbon/Emery (and the
Division's) request for a hypothetical capital structure of 35% debt and 65% equity was
imbalanced in favor of Carbon/Emery, and against the statewide base of consumers that
pays in to support the UUSF. R. 1977-1979. Mr. Brevitz stated that "competitive firms
seek to optimize capital structure to provide the lowest overall weighed cost of capital."
R. 1977. Mr. Brevitz testified that "Carbon/Emery's revenues and cash flows are stable,
and thus it has ample room to leverage its capital structure and reduce its overall required
rate of return. As a public utility, Carbon/Emery is able to borrow at low cost from
entities such as CoBank." R. 1978. Mr. Brevitz testified that assuming only 35% debt in
the capital structure unreasonably and artificially raises the overall rate of return
requested by Carbon/Emery. R. 1978. Mr. Brevitz also testified that "this case is a
perfect example of why using such a rule, or 65% equity assumption has an impact in
ratemaking settings that are [sic]contrary to the public interest." R. 1979. Mr. Brevitz
identifies the debt ratios taken from six publicly traded companies which he states "are
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often and regularly used as 'comparable companies' for purposes of rate of return
~

analysis for rural telephone companies in state universal service fund proceedings." R.
1979
% Long Term Debt to total Capital
Alaska Communications (ALSK)
CenturyLink (CTL)
Consolidated Communications (CNSL)
Frontier Communications (FTR)
Shenandoah Telecom (SHEN)
Windstream (WIN)
Average

2013
76.80%
54.00%
89.00%
66.00%
48.91%
91.10%
70.97%

2014
75.60%
57.30%
81.00%
72.17%
43.79%
97.25%
71.19%

R. 1979. From this data, Mr. Brevitz recommended a 50/50 capital structure. R. 1979.
Douglas Meredith testified that Mr. Brevitz comparison of large companies is
unconvincing and noted that "only [Shenandoah] is relatively 'close' to the size of
Carbon/Emery and it has 43 percent debt." R. 1605.
From this testimony, the Commission selected Shenandoah as the company whose
debt ratio Carbon/Emery should mirror, even though there was no evidence offered by
Ci>

any party to support the selection of one random company upon which to base the capital
structure debt imputation. In reaching this conclusion the Commission stated "the Office
has presented evidence that it is generally easier and more affordable for a utility such as
Carbon/Emery to find a lender, as opposed to finding public investors." R. Vol. 2, 1911.
Further, "according to the Office's data, companies that are at least somewhat similar to
Carbon/Emery typically had debt ratio of at least 43. 79% during the test year, and at least
one similar company had a debt ratio of 97 .25%." Id.

•
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It is important to note that Carbon/Emery is not arguing that the Commission erred
in imputing some level of debt to Carbon/Emery. Rather, Carbon/Emery takes issue with
the selection of the debt percentage to be imputed and the method of its selection, and the
departure from existing Commission practices. The Commission stated "the Office's
data shows that reasonably comparably non-subsidized telecom companies had debt
positions of at least 43. 79% during the test year and that Carbon/Emery had a very
similar debt position of 41.86%" in its 2009 docket. Accordingly, we find a hypothetical
capital structure of 43.79% debt and 56.21 % equity to be just and reasonable." R. Vol. 2,
1912.
The Commission did not provide any distinguishing fact or reason to justify a fair
and rational basis for not affording Carbon/Emery the same treatment that other regulated
telephone companies have received since 2008. As stated above, Commission's finding
on a capital structure of 43.79% debt is not supported by substantial evidence and should
be reversed by this court and remanded to the Commission.
More importantly, however, the Commission's finding on capital structure in
Carbon/Emery's case does not identify any standard or any method regarding capital
structure that would offer any precedential value or regulatory guidance to Carbon/Emery
(or any telecommunications company) seeking Universal Service Funds in the future.
The next time Carbon/Emery seeks to file a Universal Service Fund Application should it
look at Shenandoah Telecom and mirror Shenandoah's current capital structure at the
time of filing its application? Of course, that would be an absurd result. Or is the
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Commission saying that in all instances going forward, it will impute 43. 79% debt to
(i)

Carbon/Emery regardless of Carbon/Emery's actual debt? Unlikely. 4
Adopting the capital structure for Carbon/Emery based on one single telecom
company, without identifying any method or standard for that selection will require
Carbon/Emery to litigate the capital structure issue each and every time it seeks a rate
increase or a distribution from the USF. This is not a just and reasonable result, and will
only serve to increase litigation costs and expenses for the company, the Commission, the
Division and the Office. This decision is arbitrary and capricious and is not supported by
substantial evidence.
Moreover, Utah law requires that "as necessary to accomplish the purpose of this
section, the fund shall provide a mechanism for specific, predictable and sufficient funds .
. ." Utah Code Ann. § 54-8b-15(9). Additionally, the Public Service Commission was
required "to establish rules governing the administration of the fund" and have a bill
prepared for the 1998 General Session of the Legislature "to place in statute as much of
the regulation implemented by rule pursuant to the act the commission believes is
practicable." Utah Code Ann. § 54-8b-15(3) and (13 ).
To the extent that the Commission has consistently failed and refused to articulate
any standards on capital structure, which is an integral part of the rate of return
calculation, the Commission should not be permitted to depart from prior practice
without articulating specific facts and reasons. Further, if the Commission is going to

®>

*

4

The absurdity of the Commission's approach is illustrated by the fact that the debt
structure of Shenandoah was only 32% at the end of 2015, according to Yahoo! Finance.
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depart from standard practice, it should be required to adopt a capital structure imputation
that articulates a standard, and provides guidance to Carbon/Emery going forward. To do
otherwise, as the Commission has done here, is arbitrary and capricious and this Court
should remand this issue back to the Commission to articulate appropriate facts, and
establish a proper standard for its selection of the imputed capital structure.

3.

The Commission Erred In Determining The Appropriate Depreciation
Expense For Carbon/Emery During The Test Period.
Carbon/Emery uses the FCC prescribed Uniform System of Accounts contained in

47 CFR Part 32. R. 57. Carbon/Emery has, since its inception as a company, calculated
its depreciation expense using a straight-line calculation using a group plan of
accounting. R. 1147; R. Vol. 2, 40-41; R. 596-624. Carbon/Emery applies the
depreciation rates as set by the Commission in Docket 05-2303-01 to its group accounts.
R. 146, 1612.
Using the group asset method of depreciation that Carbon/Emery has employed
since its inception, Carbon/Emery's CFO Darren Woolsey calculated Carbon/Emery's
depreciation expense for purposes of Carbon/Emery's USF Application. R. Vol. 1, 203.

Mr. Woolsey and Mr. Meredith testified that Carbon/Emery's depreciation expense
number for the test year is representative of the depreciation expense the company will
experience in the next five years. R. Vol. 2, 998 at pp. 22 and 115.
The Division resisted Carbon/Emery's group method of depreciation because the
Division claimed that Group Depreciation as currently used by Carbon/Emery modified
the Commission approved rates of depreciation. R. 143. Specifically, the Division
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testified that the Commission approved certain rates of depreciation, but Carbon/Emery's
i)

use of group asset depreciation results in assets being depreciated faster than the rate
approved by the Commission, resulting in a mismatch between the depreciation expense
and the asset lives. R. 145-146.
To combat this, the Division identified five acceptable methods of depreciation,
and suggested a depreciation expense reduction, based on a single asset straight-line
method of depreciation. R. 148. Carbon/Emery resisted the elimination of the group
method of depreciation as being contrary to FCC Part 32, and proposed application of the
FCC Method of depreciation identified by Mr. Hellewell in his Direct Testimony. The

~

FCC Method of depreciation recalculates the group depreciation rate based on the plants
average remaining life, future net salvage value, and depreciation reserve ratios. R. 149.
In Mr. Woolsey's Sur-surrebuttal Testimony, Carbon/Emery recalculated its test
year depreciation expense utilizing the FCC Method, which resulted in a test year
depreciation expense similar to that contained in Carbon/Emery's application. R. Vol. 2,
370. The Division did not calculate the depreciation expense using the FCC Method. R.
Vol. 2, 998, at p. 220. Rather, in Mr. Hellewell's Sur-surrebuttal testimony, the Division
used a vintage method of depreciation, and calculated the test year depreciation expense
adjustment at

. R. Vol. 2, 773. The Commission adopted the depreciation

expense adjustment calculated by the Division using the vintage method for the test
period. R. Vol. 2, 1920.
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-4, "if in the Commission's determination of
just and reasonable rates the commission uses a test period, the commission shall select a
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test period that, based on evidence, the commission finds best reflects the conditions that
a public utility will encounter during the period when the rates determined by the
commission will be in effect." As suggested by Carbon/Emery, and agreed to by the
Division and the Office, the Commission established 2014 as the effective test year.
Carbon/Emery is not requesting review of the Commission's determination of the test
year. Rather, Carbon/Emery is seeking review of the depreciation expense adjustment to
the test year adopted by the Commission.
It is a fundamental goal of rate making to select a test year and adjust it for known
and measurable changes such that it reasonably approximates the rate-effective period.

Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 861 P.2d at 422, citing Utah Dep't ofBusiness Reg. v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 614 P.2d 1242, 1248 (Utah 1980); see City & County ofSan Francisco v.
Public Util. Comm'n, 703 P.2d 381,387 (Cal. 1985) (en bane); L.S. Ayres & Co. v.
Indianapolis Power & Light Co., 351 N.E.2d 814, 828-29 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976). Implicit
in the Commission's adoption of the Division's depreciation expense adjustment to the
test year is the Commission's determination that the test period with the depreciation
expense adjustment adopted by the Commission reasonably approximates the effective
period of Carbon/Emery's UUSF request, as required by Utah law. This implicit
conclusion is not supported by substantial evidence in the record.
Further, while both the Division and the Commission state that it is a fundamental
ratemaking principal that, generally, an asset's depreciable life should match-as closely
as practicable-its actual service life (R. Vol. 2, 1918), the evidence in this case does not
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support a finding that the Commission adopted depreciation method ensures that
Carbon/Emery's assets' depreciable lives match their actual service lives.
In an effort to meet its marshaling obligation, Carbon/Emery has reviewed the
testimony in this case for evidence that supports: (1) the Commission's implicit finding
that test year, as adjusted by the Commission reasonably approximates the effective
period of Carbon/Emery's UUSF request; and (2) that the Commission's depreciation
method accomplishes the fundamental ratemaking principal that, generally, an asset's
depreciable life should match-as closely as practicable-its actual service life. R. Vol.
2, 1918. It was a difficult task.
In support of the finding that the Commission's depreciation method appropriately
matches the depreciable lives of Carbon/Emery's assets with their actual remaining life,
the Commission likely relied on the testimony of the Division Witness Mr. Hellewell,
who stated that "the Division's calculation for depreciation expense was calculated this
way [single asset straight-line] for the purpose of reaching a reasonable depreciation

•

expense that would match actual diminution in value during the test year without rapidly
accelerated depreciation." R. Vol. 2, 766-767. Further, during the hearing, Mr. Hellewell
was asked about the Division's depreciation expense adjustment and reiterated that the
Division's depreciation expense was simply an adjustment of an unreasonably inflated
depreciation expense to a reasonable depreciation expense that better matches the actual
diminution in value of Carbon's assets during the test year. R. Vol. 2,998 at pp. 214-215.
As further support for the finding the Commission's chosen method of
depreciation matches depreciable lives with actual remaining lives, the Commission may
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•
have relied upon Mr. Hellewell's testimony regarding the Group-Vintage Method of
depreciation. Mr. Hellewell testified that "vintage depreciation would allow for assets
capitalized within a certain date range to be grouped and depreciated together, any new
assets purchased outside that date range would then be placed in a new group. Groups
would then be depreciated using a straight-line method until the group is fully
depreciated. Once fully depreciated, if still used and useful, the group would remain
intact and no further depreciation expense would be generated .... The clear benefit of
vintage groups is the significant reduction in the variation between depreciable life and
actual asset useful life." R. Vol. 2, 770-771.
However, reliance on that testimony would have been inappropriate because,
while the Division claims that the purpose for making its depreciation adjustment was to
match the actual diminution of value of Carbon/Emery's assets, Mr. Hellewell testified
during cross examination, that the Division does not know what the actual diminution of
value of Carbon's assets was during the test period, and in fact, as discussed above,
neither the Division nor the Office examined the plant or facilities at Carbon/Emery to
enable it to determine the condition of the plant or the actual remaining life of the plant.
R. Vol. 2, 998 at pp. 53 and 216. Further, the record is devoid of any testimony showing
that the vintage method, as employed by the Division and the Commission actually
reduced the variation between the depreciable life and the actual asset useful life because,
as set forth above, there is no testimony showing a calculation of the actual useful
remaining life of the assets grouped together in the Commission's chosen vintage
method. Thus, the record is lacking evidentiary support for the Commission's conclusion

41

that the vintage method as applied reduces the variation between the depreciable life and
•

the actual asset useful life.
The Commission in its Order on Reconsideration states that it is not necessary to
inspect the plant or approximate the remaining value of Carbon/Emery's assets, because
the depreciable lives of those assets have been established by prior Commission order. R.
2948. This statement demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding regarding
depreciation and the purpose for which depreciation is used. While the Commission is
correct that the Commission sets the depreciation rates by order, the depreciation rates set
by the Commission identify the depreciable lives of the assets, but they do not take into

•

consideration the remaining useful life of an asset. For example, the Commission may
set the depreciation rate of vehicles at 20%. This means that a vehicle has a depreciable
life of 5 years. However, a vehicle may remain in service, with useful life, longer than
five years. Therefore, an analysis of both an asset's depreciation rate and its actual
remaining useful life is required. The method of deprecation selected by the Commission
did not utilize a calculation of actual remaining useful lives.
The Division glosses over this point and testifies that "determining how large the
vintages should be remains a question that will produce varied results. A one year
vintage would produce depreciation expense similar to single-asset depreciation; groups
with too wide a date range would accelerate depreciation expense on new assets similar
to Carbon/Emery's current groups." R. Vol. 2, 772. To address these issues, the Division

•

applied a flat percentage of 20% against the current depreciable life of the asset group to
determine the appropriate "vintage." Id. According to the Division, this method results in
42

•
one year vintages for vehicles, which normally have a 5 year life; and 4 year vintages for
assets like buried cable or buildings that normally have a 20 year life. Id. The Division

•

then configured " the vintage groups to allow each unit in its group to reach its
depreciable life within the group timeline." Id. The Division testified in a conclusory
fashion that utilizing this method "there would be no spikes in depreciation expense at the

•

end of the group's depreciable life, and no acceleration; each year would be reasonably
representative of the future and past years." R. Vol. 2, 773. However, as demonstrated
below, Mr. Hellewell admits that the depreciation expense suggested by the Division, and

•

adopted by the Commission is not reasonably representative of the future and past years.
With regard to the implicit decision made by the Commission that the test year,

•

with the depreciation expense adjustment adopted by the Commission reasonably
approximates the effective period of the UUSF, there is no support for this finding in the
record. As demonstrated above, while Mr. Hellewell testifies that under the Group

•

Vintage method "each year would be reasonably representative of the future and past
years," (R. Vol. 2, 773), when asked specifically about the years in the period to be
reasonably covered by Carbon/Emery's UUSF request, M r. Hellewell testified that the

•

Division's depreciation expense adjustment is not representative of the depreciation
expense going forward and that the depreciation expense of Carbon/Emery would

•

continue to increase for at least five years. R. Vol. 2, 998 at p. 209- 212. There simply is
no testimony that the depreciation expense adjustment o f - as adopted by the
Commission is a reasonable approximation of the depreciation expense that

•

Carbon/E mery will have during the effective period of the UUSF request.
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On the contrary, Darren Woolsey has provided substantial testimony that the
Commission's adopted depreciation expense does not project a representative test period.
R. Vol. 2, 359-363.The undisputed testimony is that the Carbon/Emery depreciation
expense for subsequent years (at least through 2019) will be higher than that proposed by
the Division for the test period R. Vol. 2, 362; Vol. 2, 998 at p. 44-45. Thus, while the
using the Division's suggested method of depreciation may result in a depreciation
expense adjustment for the test year, the inquiry cannot end there. Under Utah law, the
test year, as adjusted by the Commission, must result in a test year that reasonably
approximates the effective period of the UUSF request.
The Commission minimizes this legal requirement by stating that "it was
incumbent upon Carbon/Emery to choose a test year that would be representative of the
anticipated effective period." R. 294 7. The Commission cites the argument presented by
the Division which is that "had Carbon/Emery concluded that an adjusted 2014 test year
was not representative of the rate effective period, it should have chosen to use another
test period." This argument fails to appreciate the fact that the test year selected by
Carbon/Emery, with the depreciation expense identified by Carbon/Emery in said test
year, was representative of the rate effective period until the Commission adopted the
inappropriate depreciation expense adjustment. In other words, it was the adoption of the
Group Vintage Depreciation method that resulted in 2014 's "adjusted" depreciation
expense not being representative of the rate effective period in violation of Utah law.
Additionally, with regard to depreciation expense, if the Commission's goal is
actually to match the assets depreciable lives with the actual service lives, as indicated in
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the Commission's Order, the only depreciation method in the record that included a
calculation of the remaining useful lives of the assets is the FCC Method as calculated by
Carbon/Emery in its Sur-Surrebuttal Testimony. R. Vol. 2, p. 370. Mr. Woolsey
provided a calculation of the remaining useful lives of the assets and there is no evidence
presented in this case disputing that calculation.
While all methods of depreciation are approximations of the diminution of value
of the assets, the FCC Method which resembles Carbon/Emery's chosen depreciation
·method with adjustment for actual remaining lives, will yield the best approximation of
the actual diminution of value of Carbon/Emery's assets without creating an artificial
distortion by changing the depreciation method in the middle of the life of the asset
group. Further, the FCC method is consistent with Utah Code which requires an
approximation of the actual diminution of value of the assets. Utah Code Ann. § 54-712.1 provides:
In determining depreciation expense of a telephone corporation in any
proceeding under Section 54-7-12, the Commission shall consider all
reasonable factors, including the alteration of asset lives to better reflect
changes in the economic life of plant and equipment used to provide
telecommunications services. 5
The FCC Method also addresses the concerns that the Commission has about matching
depreciation lives with actual remaining service lives, whereas, the vintage method
adopted by the Commission, as calculated by the Division is arbitrary in its use of a 20

5

The Commission, in its Order, FN 11, states that this is not a proceeding under § 54-712, however, the Commission can take judicial notice of the fact that the Commission has
routinely looked to the statutes governing rate cases for instruction in UUSF proceedings.
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•
percent adjustment factor, and does not consider the actual remaining lives of the asset
<i>

groups.
The Commission states in its Order on Reconsideration that Carbon/Emery's
failed to make its argument in pre-hearing testimony or at trial that Utah law requires and

•

approximation of the actual diminution of value of assets, and that the FCC Method of
depreciation calculates this while the vintage method does not. R. 2948. As a result, the
Commission states that this argument is not subject to consideration on review. R. 2948.
This is not accurate. First, as indicated above, the Division witness, Mr. Hellewell,
identified the "diminution in value" argument in his Sur-surrebuttal Testimony. R. 766767. Additionally, Carbon/Emery made this argument in its Post-Hearing Closing
Argument. R. 2711. As the Court is aware, unless a party makes a motion for summary
judgment on a particular issue, or a court requires prehearing briefing, there is typically
no opportunity for argument until the closing argument at the end of hearing. In this case
the Commission did not require pre-hearing briefing, and Carbon/Emery did not file for
summary judgment on this issue 6, therefore, Carbon/Emery appropriately raised these
arguments in its Post-Hearing Closing Brief, and the issues are subject to consideration
on review.

(ii)

'il

6

While Carbon/Emery did make a motion for summary judgment on depreciation issues,
Carbon/Emery's motion was limited to a different discrete issue.
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4.

The Commission Failed to Determine Whether Carbon/Emery Selection Of
The Group Method Of Accounting Was Imprudent When The Company
Implemented Group Asset Accounting.
Depreciation expense is directly related to rate base. As assets are depreciated,

they are removed from rate base and a company no longer earns a return on those assets.
Darren Woolsey for Carbon/Emery explained that "depreciation effects rate of return
calculations in two ways: first by the depreciation expense recorded in any given period;
and second by the allowed rate of return applied to the [net book value] of these
associated assets." R. Vol. 2, 43. Therefore, when a depreciation adjustment is made, it
necessarily and reasonably has an impact on rate base. As the evidence in the record
demonstrates, Carbon/Emery selected the group method of depreciation with its

•

correlating effect on rate base and applied it continuously since the company's inception
with no modifications or challenge from the Commission until this UUSF proceeding.
The Commission in this order adjusted the deprecation expense from the time the
assets were placed in service, but did not adjust the rate base for the same corresponding
period. There simply was no way the Carbon/Emery CEO could have foreseen in 2001,
when the decision to use group depreciation was made, that the Commission would

•

implement a change in depreciation method in a manner that would disrupt the
relationship between depreciation expense and rate base. The Commission cannot
determine that the company's use of group depreciation and corresponding depreciation
expense was imprudent and unreasonable because it resulted in excessive depreciation
expense since the time the assets were placed in service, but that the rate base for the
same time period was not unreasonable or imprudent. The depreciation expense in this
47

•

instance necessarily results from the decision to use group depreciation and is integrally
i)

tied to the rate base calculation.
Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-4(4) provides, in pertinent part:
If in the Commission's determination of just, reasonable or sufficient rates, the
Commission considers the prudence of an action taken by a public utility, or an
expense incurred by a public utility, the Commission shall apply the following
standard in making its prudence determination:
(i)
Ensure just and reasonable rates for the retail ratepayers of the public utility
in this state;
(ii)
focus on the reasonableness of the expense resulting from the action of the
public utility judged as of the time the action was taken;
(iii) determine whether a reasonable utility, knowing what the utility knew or
reasonably should have known at the time of the action, would reasonably
have incurred all or some portion of the expense, in taking the same or
some other prudent action.
(Emphasis added.)
The Commission did not do this when it adjusted the depreciation of the assets
from the time they were placed in service (in many instances many years ago), but did
not adjust the rate base for the same corresponding period. This was an error of law.
At the outset, the Commission argues that this issue was not timely raised because

{I)

Carbon/Emery first raised this argument in its Post-Hearing Closing Brief. As indicated
above, in a UUSF (or rate case) proceeding before the Commission, the parties rarely
have the opportunity to raise legal arguments until closing argument. The Commission
acknowledges that Carbon/Emery raised this argument in its Post-Hearing Closing
Argument, so as a matter of law, the Commission's determination that this issue was not
timely raised is in error.
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The Commission also argues that Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-4(4) applies to the fixing
of rates, which is not at issue in this case. While the Commission is correct that this
section of Utah Code applies to classification and fixing of rates, the section is instructive
on fixing the amount of a UUSF distribution, particularly where the Commission doing
the same analysis of a company's expenses as it would in a rate case. The fact is that
many of the rules, practices, and procedures that apply specifically to rate cases are
instructive in the UUSF inquiry, and this code section is no exception. Utah Code Ann. §

54-4-4(4) seeks to avoid unfair "after the fact" criticism of decisions made by the utility,
by requiring that the prudence of a utility company's action should be judged based on
the facts in the possession of the utility company at the time the decision was made.
Carbon/Emery thinks this same logic can, and should, apply in a UUSF case.
Next, the Commission argues that Carbon/Emery has not provided the
Commission the facts and circumstances it now claims the Commission must consider. R.
2953. This is not accurate. As demonstrated above, Carbon/Emery identified several facts
and factors considered by Carbon/Emery to be relevant to this issue. In particular,
Carbon/Emery testified that it carefully selected the method of depreciation - group asset
depreciation-in 2001 (R. Vol. 2, 998 at p. 25); that its use of the group method of
depreciation is permitted by 47 CPR Part 32 and used in its interstate operations. R. Vol.
2, 998 at p. 24-25. Carbon/Emery testified that application of the group method results in
a depreciation expense that is consistent with the FCC Method (R. Vol. 2, 370-371)
which the Division has testified is an acceptable method of depreciation. R. 149. Finally,
Darren Woolsey testified that the correct application of a corrective method of
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depreciation necessarily requires adjustments to depreciation expense and rate base for

a

the same corresponding period. R. Vol. 2, 46-4 7.
In short, the prudence of Carbon/Emery's choice to use the group method and its
resulting depreciation expense and rate base calculation must, pursuant to Utah law, be
judged at the time the action was taken, knowing what the company knew or reasonably
should have known at the time. Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-4(4 ). If the decision on
depreciation methods and the resulting depreciation expense and rate base calculation
were prudent when made, the Commission should not require retroactive application of a
new depreciation method. If the depreciation method and resulting depreciation expense

•

and rate base calculation were imprudent when made, the Commission should make
adjustments to both depreciation expense and rate base calculation for the same
corresponding periods-which it did not do. Finally, if the Commission wants to modify
the depreciation method going forward, it should apply the new depreciation method
prospectively so the company is not penalized for its previous "action."
The Commission stated in its Order that:
The question under Section 54-4-4( 4)(a)(iii) would not be whether
Carbon/Emery carefully considered whether to circumvent its Commissionordered depreciation schedules. The question would be whether
Carbon/Emery knew or should have known that the Commission had issued
an order setting its depreciable lives. Carbon/Emery has not argued that it
was unaware of the Commission's order.

R. 2954.
This statement is problematic. Carbon/Emery did not disregard the Commission's
order on depreciation rates.

Rather, Carbon/Emery has testified that it applies the
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Commission ordered depreciation rates to its group accounts. R. Vol. 2, 40-41; R. 596624. The "action" taken by Carbon/Emery which the Commission is required to judge, as
of the time the action was taken, was Carbon/Emery's identification of its group accounts
and its implementation of the group method of depreciation and resulting depreciation
expense and rate base calculations.
Carbon/Emery identified its group accounts pursuant to 47 CPR Part 32 in 2001.
Since that time, it has had no reason to depart from such accounts, and it had no
indication from the Commission that such accounts should be modified. On the contrary,
Carbon/Emery relied on its chosen method of depreciation to provide a stable predictable
depreciation expense used by management to forecast and plan capital expenditures and
operations.

There simply is no evidence to suggest that Carbon/Emery's choice of

method of depreciation was imprudent when made and the Commission has made- no
such finding consistent with Utah law.

CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing arguments, this Court should correct the Commission's
procedural errors related to testimony offered in rebuttal; preservation of the record; and
timely raising of issues. Further, the Commission's findings in the Order on Review,
Rehearing and Reconsideration on cost of equity, depreciation expense, and capital
structure should be reversed and remanded to the Public Service Commission.
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